Investors spend enormous effort chasing returns and far less time asking what those returns cost. At Baker Street Advisors, we think that emphasis is backwards. A strong return is never guaranteed; the fees charged to pursue it are - and so, often, are the incentives that inform which strategy an advisor shows the client in the first place.
The real question is not only why certain investments are expensive but why so much of the wealth management industry is built to point clients toward the expensive answer. Across the industry, the person recommending a product may be paid more for the complicated, costly version than for the simple, lower-cost option - an incentive that can shape behavior long before the product ever appears on a client statement.
Start where every investment begins, with a recommendation. Imagine an advisor with two ways to solve the same problem: one simple, inexpensive, tax-efficient, and easy to exit; the other expensive, complex, illiquid, and paying the advisor or platform to direct funds their way. Which one does the client hear about?
We don’t need to guess. Two economists, John Chalmers and Jonathan Reuter, studied a large public retirement plan where some employees invested with the help of commissioned brokers while others chose investments on their own. The employees who used brokers were disproportionately younger, less experienced, and lower paid - exactly the kind of savers most likely to rely on guidance. But the advice did not appear to help. Broker-guided accounts carried average broker fees of roughly 0.9% per year, held more expensive portfolios, and underperformed even a plain target-date fund, the “boring” default they might have owned with no advice at all. The study’s title doubled as its finding: Is Conflicted Investment Advice Better than No Advice? ² The lesson does not require assuming bad intentions. When compensation rewards one course of action over another, even well-intentioned advice can be shaped by the incentives behind it.
Those incentives appear throughout the industry, and private capital shows them in their starkest form. A Financial Times analysis from 2026 of sixteen large semi-liquid funds — the structures that wealth platforms have pushed hardest of late - found they had paid wealth advisers more than $2 billion in servicing fees alone since 2017, and that is before up-front commissions, which can reach 3.5% of the investment and average around 2%. Stack the annual servicing fees, anywhere from one-quarter to nearly nine-tenths of a percent, and a placement fee on top, and a single placement can pay the people who sell it many times what they would earn putting the same client in an index fund.1,3 It should surprise no one that these products are recommended with enthusiasm.

Nor are these conflicts confined to private funds. Cash can create incentives of its own. Uninvested balances may be swept to an affiliated bank, where the client receives a low rate while the firm keeps the spread; the client does not experience it as a fee, only as yield they never received. Regulators have fined large firms over sweep programs that were not built in clients’ interest, including cases where the gap between what clients earned and what they could have earned approached four percentage points.⁴
Mutual fund share classes tell a similar story. The same underlying fund can be sold in multiple versions — a cheaper one and a more expensive one that pays a recurring trail to the broker. Same portfolio, higher price, lower net return. This theme appears in nearly every corner of the industry.
Even the investment “menu” at some firms is not free: Fund companies often pay for shelf space, and the firms willing to pay more rise to the top of the list. The shelf is for rent.
That is the incentive; now consider the cost. Take one of the evergreen private investment products being sold into the wealth channel, with the kind of fee structure now common in that market. Suppose it does exactly what it promised, earning, say, 12% per year for five years - by any ordinary measure, a success. But before the client sees the return, the fee stack begins: An upfront commission comes off first, followed by an annual management fee, an ongoing servicing fee, and a share of the profits to the manager. Then comes the cost that is hardest to see: the compounding the client never receives because every dollar paid in fees is a dollar that cannot also grow. In a representative high-cost structure for these products, that 12% gross return can become roughly 8% to the client, and on a $1 million investment over five years, the difference would be approximately $250,000.

The fund worked. The hypothetical client still gave up nearly $250,000 - and it would not vanish into the market. It would have been paid out to the advisor who recommended the fund and the firm standing behind them.
You can watch that dollar from both ends inside a single fund. The same Financial Times analysis referenced above compared the high- and low-fee share classes of identical vehicles - same portfolio, same manager, separated only by who was being paid - and, by no surprise, found exactly what the link predicts. In one large evergreen fund, the lowest-fee class returned about 9.3% a year since inception while a higher-fee class returned 8%; in another, 9.5% against 7.8%. Those gaps, 1.3% and 1.7% a year, were at least as wide as those at other managers. The fee that makes a product worth selling is, almost to the basis point, the return the client surrenders to own it.6
And because most of the fee is collected whether or not the fund delivers, the sales incentive never wavers. A manager may or may not beat the market next year, but the fee is charged either way, compounding against the client year after year.
The strangest part of this investing architecture is that almost none of the structure is hidden. It is legal, and it is disclosed —somewhere, in a document that almost no one (is meant to) read. But disclosure is not alignment. The rules generally require a firm to reveal a conflict, not to remove it; a conflict you have been told about is still a conflict.
It is also why clients should be wary of the word the industry now leans on hardest: access - to top managers, to private credit, to private real estate, to “what the endowments do.” Sometimes, that access is real and worth paying for. But access is not advantage. A product is not good because it is hard to buy, hard to value, or hard to exit; it is good only if what the client keeps, after every fee and tax and unit of risk, beats the simpler thing they could have owned instead - a far higher bar than“exclusive,” and one many products never have to clear.
At Baker Street, we take no commissions, no referral fees, no placement fees, and no payments from the managers we choose. We build no proprietary products. When a fund is appropriate, we seek to use the lowest-cost option available to the client, and we seek to weigh every recommendation on return, risk, fees, and taxes together — the only figure that actually reaches the client. We have one primary source of revenue, the fees clients pay us, so our earnings do not move when a client buys one product instead of another: We are not paid more to recommend the complicated answer, not paid by managers to place client capital, and not filling a shelf that has to be filled. There is no shelf. For more details on how we construct portfolio allocations, read: 2026 Capital Market Assumptions Update | Baker Street Advisors.
Our business model does not eliminate judgment; it is designed to clear away the incentive to tilt it. Before recommending anything expensive, we ask a short, blunt set of questions:
Wealth management, from our perspective, has spent the past decade discovering two things at once. The first, from Part 1 of our series, is that firms can buy growth by buying other firms; the second is that distribution itself - moving a product into a client’s portfolio - can be one of the most profitable products a firm sells. When those incentives stack, the client’s task is not to panic but to pay attention because the return a portfolio earns and the return a client keeps are two different numbers, and the distance between them is where much of this industry makes its living.
Independence is worth the most precisely because of this: when the product is complex, the value is hard to verify, the exit is uncertain, and the fees arrive in layers.
Show us the incentive, and we will show you the outcome.